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Providing counsel and declaring God's forgiveness to troubled souls
has been the work of the Christian Church since the Galilean ministry of
its Lord. Pastoral counseling ministry is known to other religious tradi-
tions as well. As the modern age has generated new demands for spiritual
and psychological counseling, the mainline denominations have re-
sponded with clergy who are trained as pastoral counselors.
Yet, we know that many individuals will avail themselves of spiritual
assistance only when they believe the secrecy of their admissions will not
be violated. At the same time, spiritual assistance surely will be facili-
tated by the knowledge that the cleric will not be forced to divulge a
counselee's admissions in court or to the police, or be tossed into prison
for refusing to do so. Unfortunately, a survey of existing American law
reveals that in most instances such assurances cannot be given.
Both pastoral counseling and formal sacramental confession foster
situations in which the cleric hears the darkest secrets and deepest anxi-
eties of those who seek to leave their burdens behind and experience re-
birth into a new and productive life. In the course of obtaining spiritual
assistance, an individual may reveal family conflicts, psychiatric distress,
business troubles, or even criminal guilt. It is self-evident that the infor-
mation thus imparted might be desired by a spouse in a divorce case, the
police or prosecuting attorneys, employers, opposing parties in civil dam-
age litigation, the news media, and even political or business rivals. If
spiritual counseling and absolution are truly of healing value to troubled
persons, and thus of benefit to society, the need for assured secrecy is
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obvious.1 Indeed, if a cleric is unable to guarantee confidentiality, he or
she may have a duty to advise against revealing confidences, lest the
cleric become the instrument through which the matter is exposed to
others.
The problem involved here is not one of mere academic interest. Ap-
pellate courts in the United States have treated this issue in more than
seventy cases, many of them quite recent, and thus we know the matter
has been, and will continue to be, an issue in hundreds of trials. The liti-
gation has involved every field of law: murder prosecutions, selective ser-
vice compliance, wills and estates, domestic relations, personal injury
damage suits, and grand jury probes.
While church law or custom may recognize or impose an obligation of
secrecy in some situations, whether the obligation is honored by secular
courts is another matter altogether. Ethical restraints against disclosure
are not synonymous with legal restraints, and, thus, unless a secular court
has its own rule of clerical privilege, a witness cannot be excused from
testifying.'
In general, the law recognized long ago the public interest in holding
inviolable the confidentiality of communications between persons in some
special relationships.' Thus arose in the rules of evidence the concept of
"privileged communications," in which the law honored specified confi-
dences by making them immune from compelled disclosure in judicial
One Anglican authority, writing on sacramental confession, maintains that the obligation
upon the cleric to maintain absolute confidentiality (sigillum confessionis, or seal of confes-
sion) binds by "natural, divine, and ecclesiastical law. . . . If, for a moment, the idea could
be entertained that the confessor might make use of any information he received in confes-
sion, or mention even the smallest sin confessed to him, the usefulness, sanctity, and bene-
fits of the sacrament would be rendered absolutely null and void." F. BELTON, A MANUAL
FOR CONFESSORS 89 (1931). Early commentators recognized that "[slecrecy is of the essence
of penance. The sinner will not confess, nor will the priest receive his confession, if the veil
of secrecy is removed . . . ." People v. Phillips, unreported (N.Y.C. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County
1813), reprinted in W. SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA 52, 111 (1813 & re-
print 1974).
It should be noted that since the confession to a qualified member of a religion confers
total absolution from sin, "[tihe secrecy of the Confessional, . . . is . . . in a class by itself
. . . and hence not subject to merely human considerations." Regan & Macartney, Profes-
sional Secrecy and Privileged Communications, 2 CATH. LAW. 3, 7 (1956) (footnote
omitted).
See 3 S. GARD, JONES ON EvIDENCE § 21:1, at 744-45 (6th ed. 1972).
See Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 277-78 (D.C. Cir. 1959); see also Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (the public interest for privilege must override public
interest to hear testimony); 8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE § 2285, at 531-32 (3d ed. 1940) (confidentiality is a privilege not a right). "[T]he
principle of privilege [is] an exception to the general liability of every person to give testi-
mony upon all facts inquired of in a court of justice. ... 8 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 2285, at
531.
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proceedings. 4 Under this concept, one or more parties may claim the
"privilege" and refuse to testify to information disclosed within a confi-
dential relationship. This doctrine supersedes normative principles of ju-
risprudence requiring every citizen to respond to the subpoena power of
the courts and thereby reveal all competent information relating to dis-
puted issues.5 If the courts are to correctly decide the disputes before
them, and if no citizen is to be above the law, the necessity for the gen-
eral rule, and the allowance of precious few exceptions to it, are obvious.
The Watergate tapes case exemplified such competing public interests."
Probably the most familiar privileges involve communications be-
tween a husband and wife7 and an attorney and client.' Both of these
4 See Note, Privileged Communications-Some Recent Developments, 5 VAND. L. REV. 590,
590-96 (1952) (traditional rules of evidence limited the privilege to communications between
spouses, attorney-client, physician-patient and priest-penitent). See generally R. WEINBERG,
CONFIDENTIAL AND OTHER PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 8-20, 31-35, 54-55 (1967) (discussion
of attorney-client, priest-penitent, state secret, and informer privileges).
' See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281-82 (1919). "[T]he witness is bound . . . to
tell what he knows in answer to questions framed for the purpose of bringing out the truth."
Id. at 282. Blair involved testimony before a federal grand jury, id. at 276, and recognized
the existence of several qualifications and exceptions to the privilege rule, id. at 281; see also
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) ("testimonial exclusionary rules and privi-
leges contravene the fundamental principle that 'the public. . . has a right to every man's
evidence' ").
' See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-13 (1974). President Nixon asserted an
absolute privilege in response to a subpoena duces tecum demanding from him tapes and
papers for use in a criminal action against seven named defendants. Id. at 688. The Court
held that absent a showing of a need to protect military, diplomatic, or national security
secrets, the executive privilege is not applicable. Id. at 706. Privileges, the Court noted, are
"exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence [and] are not lightly created nor expan-
sively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth." Id. at 710. It has been
recognized that this search for truth, should be limited only to the extent that "permitting a
refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958) (broad exclusion of testimony
of one spouse against the other absent the consent of both); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 209, 222 (1839) (wife is incompetent to testify against her husband). The rigid rule
prohibiting the testimony of one spouse against the other recently has been modified. See
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (witness-spouse can be neither compelled,
nor foreclosed, from testifying); United States v. Nelson, 485 F. Supp. 941, 947 (W.D. Mich.
1980) (the privilege between spouses only applies to communications that were intended to
be confidential); see also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2332, at 636 (the marital privilege is
based on "confidences").
' See In re Selser, 15 N.J. 393, 404-05, 105 A.2d 395, 401 (1954). The attorney-client privi-
lege has been recognized since Elizabethan England. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §
2290, at 547 & n.1. It is founded on the belief that it is "necessary 'in the interest and
administration of justice,"' United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357,
358 (D. Mass. 1950) (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)), as well as "to
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privileges existed at common law,9 and therefore exist in the Anglo-Amer-
ican legal jurisdictions without specific statutory authorization. Other
well-known privileges include the physician-patient privilege 0 and what
traditionally has been called the clergy-penitent privilege." Neither of
these, however, was recognized at common law, and thus the privileges
exist today only to the extent that the several states provide for them,
either by legislative enactment or by rules of court.' 2 Privileged status has
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients," Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
9 See 3 S. GARD, supra note 2, §§ 21:4, 21:8; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 2290, 2333.
"0 See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2380, at 802-09. Although not recognized at common
law, see Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Owen, 111 Ark. 554, 559, 164 S.W. 720, 722 (1914); People v.
Lane, 101 Cal. 513, 514, 36 P. 16, 17 (1894); In re Estate of Koenig, 247 Minn. 580, 583, 78
N.W.2d 364, 367-68 (1956), a statutory doctor-patient privilege has been created by a num-
ber of states. See J. RICHARDSON, DOCTORS, LAWYERS, AND THE COURTS 139 (1965). For a
compilation of these early statutes, see C. DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 447-71 (1958).
"I See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 2394-2395, at 843-45. The roots of the clergy's confi-
dential communication privilege can be traced to the first century. See W. TIEMANN, RIGHT
TO SILENCE 31-32 (1964). The Seal of Confession of the Roman Catholic Church is the fore-
runner of the clergy-penitent privilege. See L. GUMPER, LEGAL ISSUES IN THE PRACTICE OF
THE MINISTRY 34 (1981). Prior to the Norman Conquest, the Seal of Confession was abso-
lute, and severe penalties were imposed for violating it. W. TIEMANN, supra at 36. Common
law, however, denied the extension of such a privilege to clergymen. Id. at 83; see, e.g.,
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 557, 561, 221 S.W.2d 87, 89 (1949) (common-law rule
that communications to clergymen are not privileged has been abrogated by statute); Kee-
nan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 166, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 1154, 417 N.Y.S.2d 226, 229 (1979)
(the nonexistence of a clergy-penitent privilege at common law is not disputed), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979); Greenlaw v. King, 1 Beav. 137, 145, 48 Eng. Rep. 891, 894 (Rolls
Ct. 1838) (clergymen are bound to disclose communications made to them).
An historical basis for the existence of the privilege can be found in the affinity that
state governments had with the Roman Catholic Church. See E. BRADLEY, THE PRIVILEGE OF
RELIGIOUS CONFESSIONS IN ENGLISH COURTS OF JUSTICE 2, 23 (1865). "The Church and State
were both Catholic, the rule of the Church upon any Religious Rite, any matter of religious
observance and discipline, which was deemed universal and absolute obligation, was binding
upon the state ...." Id. at 2. During that period, the State never questioned the sacred-
ness or inviolability of confession. Id. at 23; see also Hogan, A Modern Problem on the
Privilege of the Confessional, 6 LoY. L. REV. 1, 8 (1951) (until the reign of Henry VIII, the
law of the Church was the same as the law of England); Quick, Privileges Under the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence, 26 U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 544 (1957) ("argument as to whether [the
privilege] had a common law counterpart seems wholly academic").
" Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Decker, 150 Miss. 621, 640-41, 116 So. 287, 291-92 (1928). Privi-
lege provisions generally have been considered matters of evidence and not of substantive
law. Id. Thus, they are often governed by the respective codes of evidence adopted by state
and federal courts. Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55,
74 (1963); cf. State ex rel. Leas, 303 N.W.2d 414, 419-20 (Iowa 1971) (procedural rule of
evidence is not a substantive right). But see Woelfling v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 30
Ohio App. 2d 211, 220, 285 N.E.2d 61, 68 (1972) (physician-patient privilege is a substantive
right).
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been given by some jurisdictions in recent years to such vocations as news
reporters, 3 counselors in sexual assault cases,' 4 interpreters for the deaf,' 5
psychotherapists,' 6 accountants,' 7 and licensed psychologists.18 Some
states also have recognized privileges for such matters as trade secrets, 0
secrets of state,20 individual political votes,2" and religious beliefs. 22 In
many cases these newer vocational privileges provide substantially
broader protections than the clerical privilege provisions in the same
states.
The elements of a typical clergy-penitent privilege statute were sug-
gested twenty years ago by Emory University law professor G. Stanley
Joslin in his legal manual for clergy:
Every communication made by a person professing religious faith, or
seeking spiritual comfort, to any Protestant minister, or to any priest, or to
any Jewish rabbi, or to any Christian or Jewish minister, shall be privileged.
No such minister, priest, or rabbi shall disclose any communications made
to him by any person professing religious faith or seeking spiritual guidance,
or be competent or compellable to testify with reference to any such com-
munication in any court.2"
'3 ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (1983).
" CAL. EVID. CODE § 1036 (West Supp. 1983).
"5 VA. CODE § 8.01-400.1 (Supp. 1983).
"6 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1983); see, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 118 Cal.
App. 3d 136, 140, 173 Cal. Rptr. 145, 147 (1981) (statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege
shall be construed in favor of the patient); Simek v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 169,
173, 172 Cal. Rptr. 564, 566 (1981) (patient-psychotherapist privilege applies to records).
17 IND. CODE ANN. § 25-2-1-23 (West 1983); see, e.g., Cissna v. State, 170 Ind. App. 437, 439,
352 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1976) (certified public accountant granted privilege); In re A Special
Investigation No. 202, 53 Md. App. 96, 103, 452 A.2d 458, 462 (1982) (the accountant-client
privilege was created by statute, in derogation of common law, to protect clients' expecta-
tions of privacy).
'a IND. CODE ANN. § 25-33-1-17 (West 1983); see Southern Bluegrass Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Bd., Inc. v. Angelucci, 609 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Ky. Ct. App.) (communica-
tions to psychologists are privileged), afl'd, 609 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1980); In re Atkins, 112
Mich. App. 528, 542-43, 316 N.W.2d 477, 483 (1982) (when patient does not waive the psy-
chologist-patient privilege, testimony as to the communication cannot be admitted).
1" NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-5-8 (1979); see, e.g., Vereinigte Vaubeschlagfabriken Gresch & Co. v.
United States Treasury Dep't, 435 F. Supp. 1212, 1215 (D.D.C. 1977) (confidential commer-
cial data are exempt from disclosure).
1o NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-509 (1979); see also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2378, at 783-84
n.3 (examples from federal and state jurisdictions); supra note 6, (discussion of executive
privilege).
11 ME. R. EvID. 506 (West 1983); see, e.g., Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148, 150, 13 N.E. 700,
701 (1887) (the ballot is secret, no man casting a legal ballot may be compelled to disclose
his vote); Application of Moffat, 142 N.J. Super. 217, 225, 361 A.2d 74, 78 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1976) (voters have privilege to refuse to disclose tenor of their vote).
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-24 (West 1976).
2 G. JOSLIN, THE MINISTER'S HANDBOOK 116 (1962); see L. GUMPER, supra note 11, at 56;
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Recently, a national group of legal scholars drafted model statutes
which incorporate ideal provisions according to contemporary thought on
a variety of legal topics. The model statutes have been offered for adop-
tion or emulation by the several states. Rule 505, the group's present pro-
posal for religious privilege, was drafted as follows:
(a) Definitions. As used in the rule:
(1) A "clergyman" is a minister, priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science
practitioner, or other similar functionary of a religious organization, or an
individual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting him.
(2) A communication is "confidential" if made privately and not intended
for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the
purpose of the communication.
(b) General rule of privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose
and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the
person to a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual adviser.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the per-
son, by his guardian or conservator, or by his personal representative if he is
deceased. The person who was the clergyman at the time of the communica-
tion is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf
of the communicant.
24
As a need for protection of the clergy-penitent relationship presented
itself, each state dealt independently with the problems of establishing an
historically unrecognized privilege. 25 All but two states now accept the
privilege, and in the nine states that have adopted the Uniform Act, the
rules are virtually identical.2 However, the vagaries of the legislative pro-
cess generated greatly differing forms of the doctrine in the remaining
states.
Reese, supra note 12, at 56.
" UNIF. R. EvID. 505 (1971). See generally Reese, supra note 12, at 62-63 (original form
adopted by ALI in 1942).
25 See generally W. TIEMANN, supra note 11, at 92-93, 116 (judicial construction of priest-
penitent statutes).
" See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1979); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 2505 (West 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-16 to -18 (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
905.06 (West 1975); ME. R. EVID. 505 (West 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. R. EVID. 506 (1983);
N.D.R. EVID. 505 (Supp. 1983); VT. R. EvID. 505 (1983).
It should be noted that the Uniform Act was included in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence suggested by the Supreme Court a decade ago; however, Congress declined to
adopt it as part of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
6 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1973). "Since it was clear that no
agreement was likely to be possible as to the content of specific privilege rules," a single rule
was substituted. S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974); see infra notes 75-78 and
accompanying text.
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THE STATE PRIVILEGE RULES
An understanding of the status of the rule in any state must turn not
upon general principles, but upon an analysis of the applicable state stat-
ute or rule of evidence and the court decisions that have construed it.27
The differences among the various state provisions may be categorized
into six lines of inquiry:
1. Who may exercise the privilege?
2. Who are clergy to whom privileged communications can be made?
3. Who is bound by the exercise of the privilege?
4. Which communications fall within the privilege?
5. Where can the privilege be claimed?
6. What idiosyncrasies exist in the particular jurisdiction's rule?
The table appearing in the appendix of this paper analyzes the sev-
eral state provisions along these lines of inquiry; a general discussion of
the categories follows.
Who May Exercise the Privilege?
Most statutes and rules provide that the penitent owns the clerical
privilege and is free to waive it. In many states, the cleric, also, may claim
the privilege in addition to, or in the absence of, the penitent's claim.2
Some jurisdictions, including those that have adopted the Uniform Act,
specifically extend the power to exercise the privilege to the guardians,
conservators, executors, and administrators of the penitent or the peni-
tent's estate.
Who Are Clergy To Whom Privileged Communications Can Be Made?
Most often, state privilege provisions apply to confidential communi-
cations made to a "clergyman," or any priest, minister, rabbi, or other
licensed or ordained minister of any religion.29 Some provisions even in-
17 See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607
(1973). The Vermont statute provides: "A priest or minister of the gospel shall not be per-
mitted to testify in court to statements made to him by a person under the sanctity of a
religious confessional."
"8 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1034 (West 1966) (clergyman may claim the privilege in his
own right); see L. GUMPER, supra note 11, at 41. "California is a rarity in expressly giving
the privilege to both the penitent and the clergyperson." L. GUMPER, supra note 11, at 41.
" See L. GUMPER, supra note 11, at 36-37. Some courts have limited the privilege to confes-
sions, see, e.g., Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 268, 95 N.E.2d 304, 306 (1950)
(minister's observations not made in the course of clerical duties are not privileged), while
others have extended the privilege beyond penitential confessions, see, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Zezima, 365 Mass. 238, 241, 310 N.E.2d 590, 592 & n.3 (1974) (communication is not
limited to conversation, but may include correspondence, actions, or occurrences). There is
also considerable variance in the manner in which courts interpret the spiritual counseling
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clude "accredited practitioners" of any established denomination among
the list of enumerated clergy.30 This inclusory phrase indicates a probable
attempt to include Christian Science practitioners, but it seems to in-
clude, within its wording, the pious laity of any denomination.
New Jersey's statute contains a particularly broad inclusory phrase;
it adds to qualifying clergy any "other person or practitioner authorized
to perform similar functions."31 Nonetheless, a state court held that a nun
who worked as a teacher, even though she counseled a youth with per-
sonal problems for 5 years, did not qualify as clergy under the act because
she did not conduct religious services or perform other normal priestly
functions, and was not cloaked by church law with any power or duty to
hear confessions or to counsel students.3 2 Similar holdings have excluded
from the statutory meaning of clergy a lay employee of a Catholic welfare
association,33 and a man who served as an elder and deacon, but not pas-
tor, of a Christian Church.
3 4
requirement. See L. GUMPER, supra note 11, at 38. Compare Johnson v. Commonwealth, 310
Ky. 557, 560-61, 221 S.W.2d 87, 89 (1949) (jail-cell murder admission overheard by a Meth-
odist pastor held not privileged because it was not received while discharging religious duty)
with In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 604, 237 N.W. 589, 590 (1931) (broad statute is broadly
interpreted and privilege attaches whenever declarant seeks spiritual aid, consolation, or
advice).
10 See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-11 (1980) ("clergyman ... of any estab-
lished church of any denomination"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1979) ("minister ...or
other similar functionary of a religious organization").
, See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1976). The statute provides:
[A] clergyman, minister or other person or practitioner authorized to perform similar
functions, of any religion shall not be allowed or compelled to disclose a confession or
other confidential communication made to him in his professional character, or as a
spiritual advisor ....
Id. For a discussion of the meaning of "clergy" within the scope of the privilege, see L.
GUMPER, supra note 11, at 39-40.
31 In re Murtha, 115 N.J. Super. 380, 387, 279 A.2d 889, 892 (1971). A Catholic nun accom-
panied the suspect to the murder scene to view the victim's body. Id. at 382, 279 A.2d at
890. The nun claimed the priest-penitent privilege when questioned about these events. Id.
The court deemed the privilege inapplicable because the nun was not vested with the au-
thority to perform the religious functions of a priest, and the communications with the sus-
pect were not for the purpose of providing spiritual assistance. Id. at 386, 279 A.2d at 892.
11 State v. Lender, 266 Minn. 561, 565, 124 N.W.2d 355, 358 (1963). The Lender court re-
versed an earlier decision that had granted privileged status to records of a Catholic welfare
agency. Id. at 565-66, 124 N.W.2d at 358. Lender desired to inspect the agency records to
aid him in the preparation of his defense in a paternity suit. Id. at 561-62, 124 N.W.2d at
357. Since there was no allegation that the records contained either a confession or commu-
nication to a priest, and because the employee rather than the penitent originally claimed
the privilege, "it [was] manifest that the conditions necessary to any of the privileges as-
serted were not fulfilled." Id. at 565, 124 N.W.2d at 358. Crucial to the disposition of the
case was the failure of the evidence to establish that the employee was a cleric affiliated with
a religious organization. Id.
3' Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201, 203-04 (1881). The decision turned on the interpretation of
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Not all states, however, are so magnanimous in their inclusory word-
ing. Some have placed restrictive definitions of clergy and legitimate de-
nominations in their privilege rules in apparent attempts to keep frauds
and fly-by-nights from claiming privilege under the acts. Such awkward
legislative attempts at recognizing only "legitimate" denominations skirt
the rocky shoals of constitutional guarantees of free exercise of religion
and of equal protection of the laws. In this vein, several states have ex-
cluded clerics who do not regularly, as a vocation, devote a substantial
part of their time to ministry.3 5 Two states include only a "minister of the
gospel" or "priest" within the purview of their privilege rule, thus appar-
ently excluding Jews, many Unitarian Universalists, and non-Christian
groups that do not have a priesthood.36 In a like manner, Michigan in-
cludes only priests, ministers of the gospel, and Christian Science practi-
tioners within the operation of its rule, 7 while Georgia specifically in-
cludes only Christians and Jews."8
Laymen fall within the definition of the clergy under some statutes.3 9
One federal court ruled that where the privilege attached to a clergyman,
logically it would extend to his lay assistant in a draft counseling pro-
gram. 40 And, in a case turning entirely on denominational polity, the Iowa
Supreme Court held both the pastor and the ruling elders of a Presbyte-
rian congregation to be within the statutory meaning of "ministers of the
gospel," because Presbyterian doctrines and discipline contemplate broad
spiritual. duties for its elders."1 In addition, both Florida and the Uniform
the Indiana statute which required that privileged communications be made to the clergy-
man "in course of discipline enjoined by their church." Id. at 203. Here, the clergyman was
not "acting in the capacity of a clergyman when he had the conversation with the defen-
dant;" therefore, no privilege attached. Id.
35 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429(a)(3) (1983); see
Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the Priest-Penitent Privilege-The Ap-
plication of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 27, 32 (1967).
31 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 622.10 (Supp. 1983); Allen v. Lindeman, 259 Iowa 1384, 1390, 148
N.W.2d 610, 615 (1967); State v. Hartman, 281 N.W.2d 639, 745 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979); see
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973).
31 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (West 1982).
" GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (1981).
"' See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22(4) (Supp. 1983). This section provides: "A clergy-
man's secretary, stenographer or clerk shall not be examined without the consent of the
clergyman concerning any fact, the knowledge of which was acquired in such capacity." Id.
It is unresolved whether a clergyman's consent is necessary "to prevent another from dis-
closing a confidential communication." See id. § 13-1-22(2).
40 In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 436 (C.D. Cal. 1971). The Verplank court extended the
clergyman-communicant privilege to include a minister's nonordained counseling staff, rea-
soning that the counselors were found to be engaged in duties related "in a general way" to
those of a minister. Id.
4' See Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 346-47, 161 N.W. 290, 293 (1917). In
Reutkemeier, a father sued the person who had allegedly impregnated his 14 year-old
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Act specifically include within the privilege communications made to lay
persons when a penitent reasonably believes the confessor to be a clergy-
man. 42 However, a federal appeals court held in a tax case that a corpora-
tion that engaged in religious broadcasting clearly could not claim any
privilege under clergy-penitent principles.
Who Is Bound By The Exercise Of The Privilege?
In most applications of the privilege, the cleric is bound by the seal
of confidentiality and is prohibited from revealing admissions made by a
penitent or counselee. The wording of most statutes includes clergymen
only. However, the wording of some statutes, including the Uniform Act,
apparently would include those who might learn inadvertently confiden-
tial information contained in a penitential communication, such as a
cleric's secretary or the administrator of a deceased cleric's estate, and
even an intentional eavesdropper or thief of a cleric's records."3 Missis-
sippi specifically has included the "secretary, stenographer or clerk" of a
clergyman within the privilege."
What Communications Fall Within The Privilege?
The various state provisions, and the cases construing them, clearly
envision privilege protection only for confidential matters taken to a
cleric, in his or her role as a cleric, by one seeking spiritual assistance.45
daughter. Id. at 344, 161 N.W. at 291. The defendant attempted to have the girl's confession
to a pastor and group of elders disclosed at trial. Id. The Reutkemeier court denied the
disclosure, construing the state privilege statute as extending beyond the pastor to include
the group of elder churchman. Id. at 347, 161 N.W. at 293.
" See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505(1)(a), (2)(d) (West 1984).
43 The Roman Catholic Code of Canon Law provides that the "obligation of preserving the
sacramental seal is binding also on an interpreter and on all others to whom knowledge of
the confession shall have come in any way." 2 J. ABBo & J. HANNAN, THE SACRED CANONS
(2d rev. ed. 1960) (Canon 889).
The Florida statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505(2) (West 1979), provides that "[a] person
has a privilege to prevent another from disclosing . . . a confidential communication,"
Id. The California statute and the Uniform Act similarly confer upon the penitent the privi-
lege "to prevent another from disclosing ... a penitential communication." See CAL. EvID.
CODE § 1033 (West 1983); supra text accompanying note 24.
44 MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22(4) (Supp. 1983).
15 See Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 166-67, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 1154, 417 N.Y.S.2d 226,
229-30 (priest's refusal to testify before a grand jury investigating abuses within the Correc-
tions Department not protected by priest-penitent privilege because he was not acting in a
spiritual capacity), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979); In re Fuhrer, 100 Misc. 2d 315, 320-21,
419 N.Y.S.2d 426, 431 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1979) (clergyman-penitent privilege not
applicable when a rabbi is under criminal investigation because of lack of "spiritual" mat-
ters); Masquat v. Maguire, 638 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Okla. 1981) (advice sought from a fellow
nun relating to employment matters not within the privilege).
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When those elements are not present, a claim of privilege will not attach
and the cleric will be as amenable to the courts' requirements of disclos-
ure as every other citizen.4
Thus, a casual conversation with a cleric, or a situation in which a
cleric is involved other than as a minister, would not qualify. For in-
stance, when a clergyman was involved with some parishioners in a stock
transfer deal that did not have any religious aspect, the cleric could not
be prevented from testifying about the matter.4 And, when a jail chap-
lain was requested by an inmate to convey a message to other parties, and
no specific spiritual assistance was involved, the chaplain, it was found,
could be forced to testify to the transaction." Similarly, in a murder case,
when the defendant expressed his intention to kill his wife and her par-
amour to his friend and frequent companion, who happened to be a cler-
gyman, the privilege was not available.4
The applicability of many older privilege statutes is limited to a
"confession" made by a penitent.50 One statute even limits the privilege
to statements made in "the sanctity of a religious confessional."51 In addi-
tion, many jurisdictions provide that the confession, or communication,
must be received by the cleric within "the course of discipline" of his or
her denomination. 52
4 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 95 Iowa 381, 384-85, 64 N.W. 277, 278 (1895) (communication
not privileged because defendant did not confide in the minister for purpose of obtaining
spiritual assistance); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 557, 566, 221 S.W.2d 87, 89 (1949)
(unsolicited visit by minister to defendant's jail cell did not result in any privileged commu-
nication where minister did not assume confessor role).
17 See Milburn v. Haworth, 47 Colo. 593, 595, 108 P. 155, 156 (1910). The privilege does not
apply when conversations between priest and penitent concern business matters. United
States v. Gordon, 493 F. Supp. 822, 823-24 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 655 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.
1981). In Gordon, the district court held that the scope of the privilege was limited to com-
munications with a clergyman acting in his spiritual capacity. 493 F. Supp. at 824.
48 See State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208, 216 (Minn. 1980). The Black court reasoned that the
privilege does not apply unless the penitent seeks religious advice "with the expectation
that [the matter] would remain confidential." Id.; see Christensen v. Pestorious, 189 Minn.
548, 552, 250 N.W. 363, 365 (1933) (no privileges attaches where penitent does not seek
spiritual advice).
'9 See Burger v. State, 238 Ga. 171, 172, 231 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1977) (privilege does not apply
to communications outside the realm of spiritual guidance).
10 See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2395, at 845-47.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973).
52 See Reese, supra note 12, at 61-62. Twenty-two states have enacted statutes which con-
tain some variation of the following: "A priest or clergyman shall not, without consent of the
person making the confession, be examined as to any confession made to him in his profes-
sional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the Church to which he belongs." Id.
(footnote omitted); see Sherman v. State, 170 Ark. 148, 150-51, 279 S.W. 353, 354 (1926)
(requirement that communication be received "in the course of discipline enjoined" by the
religion held to preclude privilege where there was no obligation upon the membership to
confess their sins); In re Estate of Soeder, 7 Ohio App. 2d 271, 300-02, 220 N.E.2d 547, 567-
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The question of just what constitutes a "confession" and what is a
denominational "discipline" has been answered in very different ways by
different courts. These issues were given an extremely broad reading by
the Minnesota Supreme Court some years ago. 3 In In re Swenson, the
court declined to limit the word "confession" to a formal, sacramental
setting, 4 and held that the term includes "[any] penitential acknowledg-
ment to a clergyman of actual or supposed wrongdoing while seeking reli-
gious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort." 55 The court acknowledged that
a "clergyman's door should always be open," without regard to whether a
penitent is a member of the cleric's church. The Minnesota statute's re-
quirement that a "confession" be "in the course of discipline" enjoined by
the denomination was addressed by the court in a single, cavalier sen-
tence: "It is a matter of common knowledge, and we take judicial notice
of the fact, that such 'discipline' is traditionally enjoined upon all clergy-
men by the practice of their respective churches. 5 6 The Swenson case
involved a Lutheran pastor who had been found guilty of contempt in a
divorce case because he would not reveal admissions of adultery made by
one of his parishioners. The court's liberal approach doubtlessly was
flavored by its sympathy for the pastor in a delicate circumstance.
A more restrictive interpretation of a "confession" was adopted in
Sirnrin v. Simrin,5' a California case involving a rabbi's marital counsel-
ing. The court held that general counseling simply could not be character-
69 (1966) (Ohio court narrowly interpreted statute, restricting the privilege to confessional
settings); cf. Alford v. Johnson, 103.Ark. 236, 237-38, 146 S.W. 516, 517-18 (1912) (testimony
of minister was not privileged as communication was not "enjoined by rules of discipline" of
the religion). Jurisdictions are divided on whether the pentient must be of the same denomi-
nation as the priest. Compare Kohloff v. Bronx Say. Bank, 37 Misc. 2d 27, 27-28, 233
N.Y.S.2d 849, 850 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1962) (privilege attaches even though the
penitent and cleric are not members of the same denomination) with Angleton v. Angleton,
84 Idaho 184, 199-200, 370 P.2d 788, 797 (1962) (statements made by a non-Catholic to a
Catholic priest did not result in priest becoming an incompetent witness).
53 See In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 604, 237 N.W. 589, 590-91 (1931). In Swenson, the
clergyman claiming the privilege was a Lutheran pastor who was called by the plaintiff as a
witness in a divorce action. Id. at 603, 237 N.W. at 590. The plaintiff sought disclosure of a
statement allegedly made by her husband indicating that he was guilty of adultery. Id. The
court concluded that the disclosure was for spiritual assistance and, therefore, the clergy-
man-penitent privilege applied. Id. at 606-07, 237 N.W. at 591-92.
Id. at 604, 237 N.W. at 590.
Id. The application of the case in the matrimonial area is particularly beneficial for pur-
poses of marriage counseling. See W. TIEMAN, supra note 11, at 121-22 (1964). The impor-
tance of maintaining a confidential relationship between a pastor and a married couple
should not be overlooked. Id. at 122.
183 Minn. 602, 605, 237 N.W. 589, 591 (1931).
, 233 Cal. App. 2d 90, 94, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378-79 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). In Simrin,
the applicable statute limited the privilege to "confessions in the cause of discipline en-
joined by the church." Id. at 94, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
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ized as a confession within the statutory meaning."8 Likewise, in a suit by
a husband alleging alienation of affections because of a reactionary Cath-
olic group's influence upon his wife and children, an Ohio court ruled that
a simple conversation between the spouse and a bishop could not be priv-
ileged because it was not a "confession," as required by the Ohio privilege
statute at that time.5 9 Finally, where a woman has visited casually with a
Lutheran pastor at a nursing home, an Indiana court ruled that, although
the pastor had sometimes calmed the woman when she was distraught,
their conversations were not "confessions or admissions" made to him "in
course of discipline enjoined" by his church.60 Thus, the pastor was com-
pelled to testify as to her mental competency in a will contest."'
Some of the more liberal statutes apply the privilege rule to a "com-
munication" to a clergyman, as opposed to a "confession."6 2 Accordingly,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the display of a gun
to a minister might constitute such a communication, if it occurred in the
course of spiritual counsel.6"
The presence of denominational discipline as to secrecy of confes-
sions, or other confidential matters, may be crucial to recognition of the
61 Id. at 94, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79. The court held that information imparted to a priest
acting in his role as marriage counselor was outside the scope of the privilege. See id., 43
Cal. Rptr. at 378-79. The statute was subsequently amended to provide a clergy-penitent
privilege for "confidential communications" made in "the presence of no third person." CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1032 (West 1966).
" See Radecki v. Schuckardt, 50 Ohio App. 2d 92, 96, 361 N.E.2d 543, 546 (Ohio Ct. App.
1976). In Radecki, the court relied in its holding upon a statutory provision that required
the conversation to be held in a confession. See id. at 97, 361 N.E.2d at 546 (construing
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B) (Baldwin 1953)). The statute has since been amended to
include "information confidentially communicated" to a clergyman. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.02(C) (Page 1979).
00 Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 268, 95 N.E.2d 304, 306-07 (1950).
" Id. at 269, 95 N.E.2d at 307.
" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. Rule 505 (1979); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1033 (West 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146b (West Supp. 1983); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4316 (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1973); FLA. STAT. § 90.505
(1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. Rule 506 (1981); IowA CODE §
622.10 (Supp. 1983); KAN. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-429 (Vernon 1965); Ky. RaV. STAT. §
421.210 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:477 (West 1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 9-111 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20A (Michie/Law. Coop. 1959); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 13-1-22 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (Vernon 1949); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.255
(1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 3-532 (1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1980); OR. REV.
STAT. § 44.040 (1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (Purdon 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23
(1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-13-17 (Law. Co-op. 1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-17
(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3715a (Vernon
Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 8.01-400 (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. § 905.06 (1975); ME. R. EVID. 505
(Vernon 1964); N.M. R. EVID. 506 (1983).
63 Commonwealth v. Zezima, 365 Mass. 238, 241-42, 310 N.E.2d 590, 592 (1974).
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privilege by secular courts. Unfortunately, most Protestant denomina-
tions have no such discipline at all. Even Anglican and Roman Catholic
canonical provisions appear to apply only to sacramental confessions.1
4
While English canon law has always prohibited a priest from revealing
any "crime or offense" admitted to him in his official duties, 5 the Episco-
pal Church in the United States only recently adopted a formal discipline
as to secrecy of confessions.6 Of course, an expectation of secrecy sur-
rounding the confessional has long existed in Christendom."
Where Can The Privilege Be Claimed?
Because the privilege rule is merely a rule of evidence and not a part
of substantive law, its applicability and availability may vary within any
given jurisdiction. In many states, the privilege rule makes no mention of
the forums or sorts of matters in which it may be asserted. 8 It is argued
that it would be senseless to protect in formal courts of record a commu-
nication that could still be uncovered under less solemn circumstances,
such as coroners' inquests, justice of the peace proceedings, and bureau-
cratic and legislative investigations. Therefore, it is submitted that absent
a statutory restriction, the privilege should be applied in all judicial,
quasi-judicial, and governmental proceedings.
Some states do, however, limit the applicability of the privilege. One
state has different rules for civil and criminal courts, 9 while several states
" Codex Juris Canonici; Canon 889 provides:
the sacramental seal is inviolable, and the confessor must therefore carefully beware
of betraying a penitent by words or signs, or in any other way, for any reason whatso-
ever. The obligation of keeping the sacramental seal also binds the interpreter and all
others to whom the knowledge of the confession has in any way come.
"5 Canon 113, enacted in 1603, provides that a priest "[may] not at any time reveal and
make known to any person whatsoever any crime or offense so committed to his trust and
secrecy (except they be such crimes as by the laws of this realm his own life may be called
into question for concealing the same) under pain of irregularity."
" The Episcopal Church's Book of Common Prayer contains the following rubric: "The
content of a confession is not normally a matter of subsequent discussion. The secrecy of a
confession is morally absolute for the confessor, and must under no circumstances be bro-
ken." PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE U.S.A., THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 446
(1977). Violation of the rubric is a triable offense in the church courts under Title IV, Canon
1, of the Episcopal Church. Prior to 1979, that denomination had no requirement of secrecy
in America.
7 For a summary of the history of the confessionary in practice in Christendom, see
Michael C. Smith, "Confession in the 1979 Book of Common Prayer: Catholic Origins and
Anglican Praxis," ST. LUKE'S J. OF THEOLOGY, Vol. 24, 277-85 (Sept. 1981).
" See, e.g. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1979); KAN. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-429
(Vernon 1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1983); ME. RULE OF EVID. 505
(1983).
69 Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477 (West 1981) (clergyman not permitted to disclose
communication in criminal trial without consent of person making it) with LA. REV. STAT.
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make the rule applicable only in civil actions.7" Other states specify the
forums in which the doctrine is available;7 West Virginia, for example,
applies the rule only in domestic relations courts.
72
THE FEDERAL RULE
It should be noted that, because the clergy-penitent privilege has
never been considered a constitutional issue, the formation of the rule is
one that must be left to the several states. Thus, the federal courts have
not been able to fashion a "national rule" that is universally applicable,
and federal action on the matter would apply only to cases tried in the
federal courts. It may be, however, that the future will bring new claims
that the privilege is indeed one that is protected by the federal constitu-
tion. Were the courts to agree, protection of clergy-penitent communica-
tions would become universal. There certainly appears to be merit to the
suggestion that the inviolability of clergy-penitent secrecy is compelled by
the first amendment, at least when the case involves a religious tradition
in which confession is considered sacramental and secrecy is enjoined by
canon or denominational discipline. An intrusion into such a confidential
relationship would seem to be an intrusion into the "free exercise" of reli-
gion. This constitutional question has been raised in several cases, but the
facts of those cases did not place them within a setting of canonical and
sacramental confession. In one, a Roman Catholic priest who worked reg-
ularly with incarcerated convicts was called before a grand jury investi-
gating organized crime. The priest asserted privilege as to matters he had
learned in his association with the convicts, but did not claim that any of
the information had come through a formal confession. The court rejected
the priest's constitutional argument out-of-hand.73 Likewise, in forcing a
nun to testify, a state court rejected a freedom of religion argument, as
well as a broad "freedom of conscience" claim. But, that court hinted that
if the polity of her denomination had sanctioned her confessionary work,
the freedom of religion argument might have been better received."'
In any event, the present situation concerning the clerical privilege in
ANN. § 13:3734.1 (West Supp. 1984) (clergyman can disclose communication in civil trial
without consent of person making it).
70 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233 (1982); VA. CODE § 8.01-400 (Supp. 1983).
71 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1983). The statute allows for the privilege in "any
proceeding, civil or criminal, in any court, whether a court of record, a grand jury investiga-
tion, a coroner's inquest and any proceeding or hearing before any public officer or adminis-
trative agency of the state or any political subdivision thereof." Id.
" W. VA. CODE § 48-2-10a (Supp. 1983).
7* In re Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 167-68, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 1154-55, 417 N.Y.S.2d
226, 230 (1979).
", In re Murtha, 115 N.J. Super. 380, 388-91, 279 A-2d 889, 893-95 (1971).
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federal courts is a curious one. With the adoption of the new Federal
Rules of Evidence by Congress in 1975,11 a novel approach was taken as
to privileged communications.76 The only provision that addresses privi-
lege in the new rules is Rule 501, which does not specify any type of privi-
leged communications but provides that (1) in civil suits in which the
substantive law of a state is applied, as in cases coming under the court's
diversity jurisdiction, the state's privilege rule, if any, will be applied as
well, 77 but (2) in criminal and all other civil cases, the federal courts are
to apply "the principles of the common law" of privilege as interpreted
"in the light of reason and experience. 7' This provision is particularly
troublesome, of course, because the clergy-penitent privilege simply did
not exist at common law. A strict construction of the rule would appear to
leave no room for a clergy-penitent privilege in most federal trials'. Per-
haps, however, new common law will be fashioned to fit the bill.
Indeed, two federal courts did appear to have fashioned something of
a new common-law right to clerical privilege prior to the enactment of
present Rule 501. One case involved a mother, accused of chaining her
children while she was away, who made admissions to a Lutheran minis-
ter;79 the other case involved a clergyman who performed draft counseling
71 Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
7 Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the provision which specifically deals with privilege, makes
no reference to any specific privilege. See United States v. Mackey, 405 F. Supp. 854, 857
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); FED. R. EviD. 501. Notwithstanding the deletion by Congress, the privilege
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court serve a useful purpose. Mackey, 405 F. Supp. at
857. The privileges specifically enumerated by the Court are "reflective of 'reason and expe-
rience.'" Id. at 858. The Mackey court, relying on the commentary to the federal rules,
found that the federal rules were merely a convenient restatement of the former federal
privileges and therefore a comprehensive guide to the law of privilege. Id. The approval of
the proposed rules by the Supreme Court tends to legitimize their use as an interpretive
guide to Rule 501. Id.; see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 77.2, at 28 (E. Cleary 2d ed. Supp.
1978); see also Transamerica Computes v. International Business Machs. Corp., 573 F.2d
646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978) (proposed rules support application of attorney-client privilege); In
re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 54, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
77 FED. R. Evi. 501; see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 76, § 74, at 26. A primary
objection to the enactment of the proposed Federal rules was the possible unconstitutional-
ity of discarding state-created privileges. See Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93 Cong., 1st Sess.
246 (1973) (statement of Chief Judge Friendly) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. The
concern was prompted by the rule's inconsistency with the principle that federal courts in
diversity actions must apply the substantive statutory and case law of the State. Id. at 147
(statement of former Justice Goldberg); see Schwartz, Privileges Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence-A Step Forward?, 38 U. Prrr. L. REV. 79, 81-82 (1976). An additional consider-
ation was Congress' intention to remove any incentive for litigants to forum shop between
state and federal courts. See Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEo. L.J. 613, 640 (1976).
18 FED. R. EVID. 501.
71 Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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services.8 0 In a like manner, the Alaska Supreme Court recently estab-
lished a new common-law privilege for psychotherapist-patient matters.8 '
Additional support for incorporation of the privilege into the common law
may be found both in the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that profes-
sional confidences to "an attorney or priest" generally are recognized at
law,8 2 and in Professor Wigmore's classic work on evidence.8"
WHERE FROM HERE?
The informed cleric will want to be aware of the privilege available in
his or her particular state. A lawyer or law library should be able to fur-
nish a copy of the rule and the cases interpreting it. Thereafter, the cleric
should endeavor to see that the confidential information that comes his or
her way is communicated in a setting that falls within the privilege pro-
tections. As a general rule, the more formal the setting the more likely the
privilege is to attach. If the denomination is one in which sacramental
confessions may be made, where possible, that mode should be used for
serious matters that hold the possibility of later scrutiny.
In addition, clergy are usually in a position to lobby their legislators
for enactment of better privilege provisions which will facilitate modern
pastoral work and free clergy to pursue their ministry of healing in this
broken world. Through personal contacd with individual legislators, reso-
lutions adopted by church bodies, and state councils of churches, desir-
able legislation may be promulgated.
From the standpoint of facilitating pastoral counseling and confes-
sionary practice in the broadest manner, it would appear that the Uni-
form Act is close to ideal. Moreover, legislatures are acquainted with the
work of the uniform laws group, and thus should be more receptive to its
model than to homegrown drafts of a privilege statute. The only altera-
tion of the Uniform Act that might be preferable would be the granting of
an absolute right to the cleric to refuse to testify, regardless of waiver by
the penitent. This would enhance the integrity of the counseling setting,
and circumvent the pressures that can be placed upon the penitent to
waive the privilege.
It should be noted that even though a state has enacted a broad priv-
ilege rule, inquiry should be made as to its applicability. If the rule exists
only as a part of the rules of evidence for trial courts, a supplemental
statute should be sought that would extend the privilege to all other fo-
so In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 418 (Alaska 1976).
s United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974).
s See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 2290-2329, at 547-635 & §§ 2394-2396, at
843-50 (3d ed. 1940).
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rums and governmental inquiries.
In addition to the adoption of satisfactory state privilege laws, indi-
vidual denominations must adopt internal policies that require the main-
tenance of secrecy for matters imparted to clerical confidence. As had
been demonstrated, state privilege rules are more likely to come into play
when the cleric's denomination requires secrecy. These policies could be
adopted at international, national, regional, or local levels. It should be
noted, however, that the existence of such a policy would place a more
stringent requirement upon clergy to honor confidences. If a confidence
were broken recklessly, the denominational policy might become ammu-
nition for the injured person in a defamation suit against the cleric.
The cleric who finds himself or herself on the horns of the dilemma,
facing a case in which testimony will be sought, should seek professional
legal assistance. Standing upon the privilege may carry the risk of a con-
tempt citation. On the other hand, a cleric might face a damage suit by a
party injured if a cleric unprofessionally violates a confidence.
Lastly, the broad privilege protection warranted by the demands of
our present age calls for a basic change in our approach to the issue-and
that includes a change in its name. It is time to leave behind the archaic
term "priest-penitent" and even the broader "clerical privilege" as we
seek to name this legal principle. A far better title to be used henceforth
is simply "religious privilege," a term that honors the religious freedom so
fundamental to harmony in our pluralistic American society.
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Gen. Stat. § 52-1466 Y N
DELAWARE
Ev. Code 10 § 4316 Y N
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Code tit. 14 § 309 Y N
FLORIDA
Stat. Ann. § 90.505 Y Y
GEORGIA
Code Ann. § 38-419.1 Y Y
HAWAII
Ev. Rule 506 Y Y
IDAHO
Code § 9-203 Y N
ILLINOIS
Rev. Stat. Ch. 51 § 48.1 N Y
INDIANA
Code § 34-1-14-5 Y Y
IOWA
Code § 622.10 Y N
KANSAS
K.S.A. § 60-429 Y Y
KENTUCKY
Rev. Stat. § 421-210 Y N
00
4)d
-~ :4) ~ >
0 4)4) 0. ~ 4
0~ 4) 0Q
N N N N
No provision
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TABLE OF ANALYSIS
State Clerical Privilege Rules
State and Citation
LOUISIANA
L.S.A. - R.S. § 13:3734.1




Cts. & Jud. § 9-111
MASSACHUSETTS






Code Ann. § 13-1-22
MISSOURI
Rev. Stat. § 491.060
MONTANA
Cond. Ann. § 26-1-804
NEBRASKA
Rev. Stat. § 27-506
NEVADA
Rev. Stat. § 49-255
NEW HAMPSHIRE





























































State Clerical Privilege Rules
State and Citation
OKLAHOMA
Stat. tit. 12 § 2505
OREGON
Rev. Stat. § 44.040
PENNSYLVANIA
Stat. Ann. tit. 42 § 5943
RHODE ISLAND
Gen. Laws § 9-17-23
SOUTH CAROLINA
Code Ann. § 19-11-90
SOUTH DAKOTA
Cod. Laws § 19-13-16
TENNESSEE
Code Ann. § 24-1-206
TEXAS
Code tit. 55 art. 3715a
UTAH
Ev. Rule 29
Code Ann. § 78-24-8
VERMONT











Y Y Y N N N N Y Y
Y N N N Y N N N N
Y N N N N N N N N
Y N N N Y N N N N
Y N N N Y N N N N
Y Y Y N N N N Y Y
Y N N N Y N N N N*
Y Y N N Y N N N N**
Y Y N Y Y N N N N
Y N N Y Y N N N N
(limited to
Y Y N Y N N N N N confessional)
N Y N N Y Y N N N
Y N N Y Y N N N N
Y N N N N Y N N N
Y Y Y N N N N Y Y
Y Y N Y Y N N N N
(divorces
only)
* Violation by cleric is a misdemeanor punishable by jail.
** Trial judge may override privilege and compel testimony for "proper administration of justice."
